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Briefly Noted

Chinese Communists Accused of Exploiting Situation in Kenya: Jomo Kenyatta, of Mau Mau fame and now President of KANU (Kenya African National Union), has sent an emissary with a letter of complaint to another point in Africa (probably Dar Es Salaam in Tanganyika) addressed to Chinese Diplomatic officials. Kenyatta allegedly says that he has received reports that Kenyan and other East African students in China are poorly treated, ill-housed, ill-fed, denied freedom of movement, and that they are taught only ideological subjects rather than those they had come to mainland China to study. The emissary has been instructed, if he does not receive a satisfactory reply from the Chinese diplomats, himself to arrange to proceed to Red China, to observe the situation and report back to Kenyatta.

On 3 January the Vice-President of another Kenyan political party, KADU (Kenya African Democratic Union), characterized communism as the "greatest single threat to an emergent African nation." He also said that the Communists buy the individual with money and replace all forms of human dignity with the myth of a Communist God." He predicted that "once the British forces leave Kenya we will have the Communist onslaught upon us.... In Kenya," and added, "that independence for which we fought will be of no use when we are stooges and quislings to the Communist world." Specifically, he accused Kenyan politician Oginga Odinga (as others before him have done), of being the recipient of large sums of money from the Communist bloc. Communist China has frequently been named as the donor. Odinga merely denies that he has been receiving moneys regularly. He admits that he has accepted some money in the past when it was needed for what he calls "very legitimate purposes."

Soviet Scientists Note Failures in USSR Training: Press Comment, 13 February 1962, reproduced from the Current Digest of the Soviet Press (31 Jan 62) a translation of an article by the noted Soviet physicist, Igor Yevgenyevich Tamm, which originally appeared in Izvestiya. It was concerned with finding and training first-class research scientists. Several features of this article call for attention. In the first place, Tamm indicates that the Soviet Union is not doing a satisfactory job of finding and training young scientists. Instead of inspiring and training young scientists, many of the best scientists are isolated in research institutes (i.e., in institutes performing defense research, etc.), while the scientific education of future physicists and mathematicians is interrupted by (Khrushchev's) requirements that they do ordinary production work. (The ideological argument for menial "productive work," as necessary for cultivating communist attitudes and discipline, was repeated on 25 December 1961 by CPSU Secretary Ilyichev) In the second place, Tamm's article indicates great respect for western science, both for individuals like Einstein (who for years was an infidel idealist in Soviet eyes) and for institutions like MIT and Caltech; he emphasizes the importance of a scientific project by saying that it was this that he spoke about in the U.S.A. We can use Tamm's statements to show not only that Soviet education fails to develop thinking individuals schooled in the humanities (see Guidance #491), but also that Communist doctrine interferes with scientific training, and that eminent Soviet scientists recognize the strength and vitality of western science.

Background: On 5 March Nikita Khrushchev is expected to address the Central Committee of the CPSU on the shortcomings of Soviet agriculture and to make proposals for its improvement. The meeting will be the first of the enlarged 330 member Central Committee named at the 22nd CPSU Congress last fall. The subject of the March meeting of the Central Committee - overtly, at any rate - will apparently center on this perennial problem. Since the 22nd CPSU Congress, Khrushchev has been touring agricultural areas in the USSR threatening and cajoling farmers in an effort to achieve sorely needed productivity. He denounced the allegedly outmoded Soviet cropping system known as the grass field (travopolye) rotation system. Exponents of this system, he said in Moscow on 14 December, become

"like priests who have no proof of God but require people to believe in his existence. . . . Ordinary people on collective and state farms produce more grain, meat and milk than is produced by experimental units that follow the prescriptions of such scientists. Excuse my crudeness, but how can one help saying 'What the hell do people want with this sort of science?' "(Animation in the hall; applause) . . . "Scientists have spoken here. They all listened attentively to the advice of Academician Lysenko. . . but among the speakers there were unfortunate scientists of whom one would like to say: 'Don't discredit the good name of science; don't put science to shame.' "(Applause) "We would like to say to such people: 'How is it that you, a scientist, a Doctor of Sciences, consider that you are conducting your business on the basis of scientific data when you buy fodder for your cattle in the experimental institute from the State?' Where is the Party's leadership in agriculture? For seven years Comrade Zaporozhets, a Communist, has been the director of this farm" (in Leningrad Oblast). "I do not know whether such a manager can be called a Communist. For you, Comrade Zaporozhets, next year should be your graduation year. Either you retain your Party ticket or you will have to hand it in and stop considering yourself a Communist. If you fail to reorganize your management and do not make sure that land is efficiently used, you will put yourself outside the ranks of the Party. "


The strong emphasis of the Soviet agricultural programs on incorporating grass in the rotation system as a soil-improving crop follows the teachings of a Russian soil scientist of Welsh extraction, V. R. Williams, Professor Williams insisted that, in order to have the best possible effect on the soil and crop yields, the sod crop must consist of a mixture of legumes (e. g. peas, beans) and grasses. Where perennial grasses did not grow well, as on sandy soils, it was recommended that crops such as lupine be grown for green manuring - for plowing under as a fertilizer. But the efforts of the Soviet government to introduce crop rotation have encountered interminable obstacles, including shortage of fertilizer and, furthermore, Soviet agricultural authorities were themselves

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often responsible for failures in crop rotation by prescribing crop goals inconsistent with the observance of the crop rotation cycle, often of 7 to 10 years duration. Khrushchev has been denouncing those he regards as the wrong kind of scientists (he admires Lysenko, who is discredited among most Western and even some Soviet biologists) and has been urging drastic curtailment of the practice of leaving land fallow to regain essential nutrients and moisture after it has been planted to crops that deplete these resources. In the short run, this device may perhaps bring a sharp increase in production and Khrushchev would then have some fine statistical figure to prove the correctness of his agricultural theories. However, these results would probably be temporary and might well have been achieved at the cost of mining the soil and seriously depleting its fertility for the future. Moreover, the Soviet drive to increase the proportion of livestock that is collectively owned runs counter to the fact that one third of Soviet livestock is still in private hands and is pastured on the land given over to grasses. Thus members of collective farms have a vested interest in the preservation of the grasslands.

At the root of the Soviet farm problem - as elsewhere in the Communist bloc - is the inability to provide the strong incentive for collective and state farmers that individual farmers have, for instance, in many countries of the non-Communist world. The typical farmer in the USSR or in any state working under the Communist system sees no reason to work very hard or to exert the kind of ingenuity that (to name a few examples) a Canadian or Australian wheat grower, a New England dairy farmer, the cultivator of a Western European vineyard, or an Iowa corn grower takes for granted. (If a good local example is available to any field station or base, it should, of course, be used.) The chronic shortage of fertilizer is also a constant problem. The result is that the Communist state is plagued by chronic food problems such as imbalance of the diet (e.g. the USSR) or caloric deficiency (of which Communist China has for years been the worst example) while in the free world there is a problem, far easier to deal with, of food surpluses. There is always a Communist state (again, for instance, China) desperately anxious to relieve the free world of some of its food surpluses.

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491. Education in the U. S. S. R.

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Background: Recently, the National Science Foundation published Nicholas DeWitt's exhaustive 856-page study entitled: "Education and Professional Employment in the U. S. S. R." (Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1961).

Mr. DeWitt, noting that the Soviets treat education as but another tool in their pursuit of world-wide power, says:

"Over the last four decades in the Soviet Union neither education nor research has been an ivory tower, isolated from society. Soviet education, from preschool to research training for advanced degrees, owes its existence to and sets its goals by the society it is called upon to serve. It is but a means to an end: to maximize the economic and political power of the Soviet regime and to strengthen thereby its international position in the struggle to establish communism throughout the world....."

"The development of Soviet education and specialized manpower resources should be viewed mainly in the context of total Communist advances - political, economic, social and cultural..... Soviet education derives its strength and, by the same token, its weaknesses, from the fact that it is centrally planned and directed by the state, which imposes norms of conformity upon the individual..."

The nature of Soviet education is characterized as follows:

"In the Soviet Union a high premium is placed upon technical and specialized, rather than general, excellence. Science and technology are particularly recognized as the foundation of national strength, and consequently they receive emphasis on all levels of the educational effort.... The quality of Soviet professional training in scientific, engineering and applied fields today is, on substantial grounds, comparable to that offered in the West. This is not true, however, in all fields - especially where political intervention is heavily felt or where exclusively applied objectives prevail."

A major limiting factor in Soviet education, which may prove to be a serious handicap in the long run, is phrased in the following terms.

"Soviet gains in developing specialized professional manpower, however, have been made at the expense of broad higher educational opportunities in other areas - the arts, humanities and social sciences. While the utility of a technical specialist to society is undeniable, the preparation of the Soviet specialist, with his lack of humanistic education and disregard for the cultural, ethical and social values cherished by the West, limits him in participating in the solution of the important social and political problems which divide the Soviet Union and the democratic world today."

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"In Soviet higher education, the development of professional competence and technical rationality is divorced, perhaps quite deliberately, from the acquisition of broad humanistic values, a fact which makes the Soviet professional a tool, witting or unwitting, in serving the aims of the Communist regime. Soviet higher education succeeds in developing the human mind to the point of high competence in many areas, but deprives it of its potential to exercise independent and creative thought in the sphere of social values. If the aim of education is to develop a creative intellect critical of society and its values, then Soviet higher education is an obvious failure. If its aim is to develop applied professional skills enabling the individual to perform specialized, functional tasks, then Soviet higher education is unquestionably a success, posing not only a temporary challenge, but a major threat in the long-run struggle between democracy and totalitarianism."

The study reports that the total education base in the Soviet Union is still far below that of the United States, with the median number of years of completed schooling put at four in Russia, compared with eleven in the United States. In 1958 the USSR adopted a much discussed and publicized School Reform bill in which universal education for children was to be extended to 10 years. A short three years later we find that the majority of Soviet youths will be pressed into the labor force with substantially less schooling than the standards call for, namely eight years instead of ten. Further, the number who are now being allowed to proceed into college is only ten out of every one hundred who enter elementary school. In 1959, higher education in the Soviet Union (with a population 50 million larger than that of the United States) had 2,200,000 students, as compared to 3,600,000 in the United States.

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492. Khrushchev, Kirov, and Trotsky

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Background: Any move to relax long-standing totalitarian controls very soon raises a problem: where is the new line to be drawn between that which is permitted and that which is not? Once reform has begun, it is hard to stop. History is full of cases in which an absolute leader, by sharing his responsibilities for the sake of short-term goals, or to meet relatively minor emergencies, has quickly lost all control of the situation: Charles I found that the Long Parliament, which he summoned in 1640, was more powerful than he was; Louis XVI had a similar experience with the Estates General in 1789; and Napoleon III began to lose control when he adopted (1868) the policy of the "Liberal Empire." No doubt Khrushchev is aware of this danger, as he has not permitted any real change in the organization of Soviet power; he has not permitted any real discussion within the CPSU. While intra-party factional discussion is not the same as discussion between several democratically-based (i.e., democratically elected) parties, it may well lead to open competition for political support outside the Communist party apparatus. With all reservations as to Leon Trotsky's own ultimate aims, Trotskyism represented the most serious demand in Soviet party history for the right to differ with the party leadership, and the right to argue for changes in party policy. If Khrushchev now admitted that Trotsky had a right to differ with Stalin, he would also implicitly admit that party members today have a right to differ with him.

Trotsky was not, of course, a liberal democrat. The best two-word epithet for him would be: "romantic revolutionary." During his career as a Communist, Trotsky was always the spokesman for revolutionary action, regardless of doctrinal or practical obstacles. Trotsky concluded, before Lenin did, that it was not necessary to wait for Russia to pass through the Marxian stage of capitalism; Russia could move immediately from Czarism to Socialism, providing that the revolution was spread throughout the world. Much of the time, Trotsky was at odds with orthodox Bolshevism; in one sense, he deviated to the left, while in another respect he deviated to the right.

a. Trotsky was a left deviationist in that he tended to over-estimate the prospects for immediate, international revolution, and to press (before others wished to do so) for radical reorganization and nationalization of the economy, under the policy of "primitive socialist accumulation." This policy, adopted later by Stalin, and still later by Mao Tse-tung, meant forcing peasants to surrender their products without real compensation; these products would serve to feed industrial workers who were producing goods (machine tools, arms, dams, steel mills, etc.) which the peasant could not purchase, and which were of no value to him. Trotsky's doctrine of "Permanent Revolution" -- i.e., continuous revolution the world over -- was also a left deviation after Lenin gave it up as impractical.

b. On the other hand, partly because of his inability to be a mere follower, he was often driven to oppose bureaucracy and enforced obedience to the party leadership. (But he could be iron-handed.)

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when he was in control himself. He reinstituted discipline in the army, directed the suppression of the Kronstadt Rebellion, argued for the elimination of any free trade union activity, and voted for the expulsion of the "Worker's Opposition" from the party.)

Once he had spread the idea that Trotsky was an enemy of the party, Stalin used the "amalgam" technique to attack others by calling them Trotskyites. When the break occurred with Tito in 1948, Tito was called a Trotskyite. The leading figures in the trials in the 1930's, such as Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Bukharin, were alleged to have conspired with Trotsky. Supposedly, the first object of their conspiracy was the assassination of the leader of the Leningrad party organization, S.M. Kirov, which took place on 1 December 1934.

Actually, most students of Soviet history now believe that Stalin himself ordered Kirov's murder, thereby ridding himself of a subordinate who seemed too popular and too independent-minded, as well as creating a pretext for the judicial murder of the old Bolshevik leadership. Some of these students, such as George Kennan, believe that the murder and subsequent trials were partly inspired by the example of Hitler's successful purge, conducted on 30 June 1934. Khrushchev himself, while not explicitly accusing Stalin of having murdered Kirov, has strongly implied as much. (See Attachment) But although Khrushchev has made disclosures, his investigation has not progressed very far in the five and a half years that elapsed between the 20th and 22nd Congresses.

Probably one reason for this lack of progress is that Khrushchev's own innocence might become suspect if too much were known about the Kirov case. We do know that Khrushchev, despite his recent criticism of the purges and of "illegality," and despite his suggestion in his 27 October 1961 speech that "Perhaps we should erect a monument in Moscow to perpetuate the memory of comrades who fell victim to arbitrary rule," himself did everything to further the atmosphere of hysteria that prevailed in the purge era. (See Attachment) We know that Khrushchev was in Leningrad on the day Kirov's bodyguard "died in an accident;" he and Bulganin were two members of the official six-man Kirov funeral commission. Three other members of this commission are known to have died or disappeared in 1937, at the time when the NKVD men who knew too much were being eliminated. Without going to any other witnesses, or collecting any further evidence, Nikita Khrushchev himself could tell much more about the Kirov case -- if he wanted to.

Another reason for the lack of progress in the clarification of the Kirov case and of the purges generally is the danger (see 1st para. above) that a rehabilitation of Trotsky would weaken Khrushchev's control of the party. In his 1956 secret speech, Khrushchev conceded that it had been necessary to annihilate those who had broken with Trotskyism "and returned to Leninist positions." But he also stated that Stalin had "played a positive role" in the "ideological fight" against the Trotskyites and others "who proposed anti-Leninist theses, who represented a political line hostile to the Party and to the cause of socialism." Curiously, Khrushchev's 27 October 1961 speech, which in many respects repeated the 1956 secret speech, made no reference of any kind to Trotsky and Trotskyism. But in November, Konstantinov, the editor of the Soviet theoretical journal Kommunist, accused the Albanian CP of holding the Trotskyite view that revolution can be imposed from outside a country; implicitly, this view was also attributed to the Chinese Communist leaders. And on 18 January 1962, Pravda printed an article by P. Pospelov, Director of the Marxist-Leninist Institute, commemorating the 90th anniversary of the

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Prague conference of the old Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. This article portrayed Lenin as the fighter for party solidarity against the disruptive forces on the right and left wings -- including the Trotskyites -- and against the indifference of Stalin. Pospelov's account suggested an analogy between the deviant Menshevik-Left radical-Trotskyite forces of 1912 and the Chinese-Albanian and Yugoslav factions of today. (Actually, Lenin's Prague conference was a rump meeting of Bolsheviks, and Trotsky and Plekhanov, the old leader of the RSDLP, boycotted the meeting because it was one-sided and threatened Social Democratic unity.)

The Trotskyites of today have not overlooked the questions which have been raised by Khrushchev's disclosures on the murder of Kirov. At the end of the 22nd CPSU Congress (perhaps encouraged by the lack of attack on Trotskyism at that Congress), Mme. Natalia Sedov, Trotsky's widow (since deceased), sent Khrushchev the following message:

You have just disclosed the provocation committed by Stalin against the old Bolsheviks, under cover of the assassination of Kirov.

I request that you undertake the total, public revision of the Moscow Trials, in which the primary defendants were Leon Trotsky and my son Leon Sedov.

I request that you make a complete, public investigation of the means employed by the GPU against Trotsky and of the assassination of Leon Trotsky in Mexico, of the instigators and executors of that crime.

I request that you inform me of the fate of my son, Sergei Sedov, arrested in 1935, whose sole crime was that he was the son of Leon Trotsky.

I request that you publish in the Russian language the complete works of Leon Trotsky which were begun in Lenin's time, and of which 22 volumes had already been published before Stalin proscribed them, and before Stalin made his falsifications.

During the period of the purge trials, unofficial commissions were formed in various countries to review the evidence of Trotsky's guilt. The most famous and important of these commissions was headed by John Dewey, the well-known American philosopher and educational theorist. On the basis of the evidence that could be collected then in Mexico and the U. S. A., the Dewey Commission concluded that the Moscow trials were frame-ups and that Trotsky and Sedov were not guilty of the charges made. The Commission's conclusions were convincing then; they are much more so today. (For a full description of the Dewey investigations, those able to obtain them should see The Case of Leon Trotsky and Not Guilty, published in London in 1937 and 1938 respectively. The New York Times Sunday Magazine of 28 January 1962 contained an article on the subject of this guidance by Harry Schwartz, "Trotsky's Ghost Haunts Communism"; this has been reproduced in Press Comment, 31 January 1962.)

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